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INTER PARTES REVIEW AND FEDERAL
LITIGATION: PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
AND INCONSISTENT RESULTS
STEPHEN N. KULHANEK†
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you own the patent on an incredible invention.
You learn that someone is infringing on your patent by
recreating and selling your invention without your permission.
The infringer refuses to enter into a licensing agreement with
you, so you sue for infringement. The trial is long and expensive,
but you emerge victorious with a giant monetary judgment.
However, during the course of the trial, the infringer petitioned
the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (“PTAB”) for an inter partes
review (“IPR”) challenging the validity of the most vital claims in
your patent. Once the PTAB instituted IPR, the infringer moved
for the district court judge to stay litigation pending the PTAB’s
final judgment as to patent validity, but the judge denied the
stay, resulting in parallel proceedings. The PTAB ends up ruling
against you, eviscerating your patent by invalidating its essential
claims, leaving you stuck with two conflicting judgments. You do
not know which judgment stands, and either result significantly
impacts your life.
This nightmare is a very real possibility. In 2011, Congress
passed the America Invents Act (“AIA”), which created IPR
procedures. Congress intended for IPR to serve as an alternative
to federal litigation in which a party seeks to invalidate a patent
in a quick, inexpensive proceeding before the PTAB. However,
IPR uses more relaxed standards than litigation for claim
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construction and burden of proof, giving IPR a petitioner-friendly
appearance. This has made IPR very popular, resulting in a high
patent invalidation rate.
This Note addresses IPR’s impact on the patent system and
what further changes Congress should consider making. Part I
discusses the patent system leading up to the enactment of the
AIA. Part II explains the details of IPR, its statistics, and an
example of IPR in practice. Part III proposes some further
alterations Congress could make to help IPR become a more
beneficial proceeding.
THE PATENT LANDSCAPE BEFORE THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT

I.

The United States patent system is rooted in the United
States Constitution, which authorizes Congress to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 Congress exercised this
constitutional power by enacting the Patent Act, which created
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).2 The
patent system is founded on the premise that awarding a limited
monopoly for inventions mutually benefits inventors and the
public.3
The PTO reviews patent applications to ensure five
requirements are met before issuing a patent: (1) the invention is
patentable subject matter;4 (2) the invention is useful;5 (3) the
invention has not been preceded in identical form in the public
1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012).
3
See History & Background, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.
uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/support-centers/patent-and-trademark-resourcecenters-ptrc/history-and-0 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (“In return for full public
disclosure, a U.S. patent offers certain rights to an inventor for up to twenty years,
during which time the inventor may exclude all others from making, using,
importing or selling his or her invention. The patent is published and disseminated
to the public so that others may study the invention and improve upon it. The
constant evolution of science and technology, spurred by the monetary incentive the
U.S. patent system offers to inventors, strengthens our nation's economy. New
inventions lead to new technologies, create new jobs, and improve our quality of
life.”).
4
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”) (emphasis added).
5
Id. (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
2
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prior art;6 (4) the invention represents a nontrivial extension of
what is known;7 and (5) the invention is disclosed and described
by the applicant in such a way as to enable others to make and
use the invention.8
Patents are made up of specifications and claims, among
other components.9 A specification is a written description of the
invention that names all the components of the invention,
describes how they work, and illustrates how they work together
to perform the invention’s function.10 A claim, often referred to
as the heart of a patent, states the precise legal definition of the
invention.11 A claim defines the boundaries of the property rights
that a patent will confer on an inventor.12 Thus, claims are
analogous to the “metes and bounds” description of a real
property deed.13
The process of acquiring a patent from the PTO is known as
“prosecution.” The average prosecution lasts about 2.77 years.14
Prosecution begins when an inventor files a patent application.15
There is a three-step review process: first, by one of seventeen
main examining groups; second, by a specific “art unit”
specializing in the relevant technology; and third, by one of the
PTO’s patent examiners.16 The examiner conducts an initial

6
Id. § 102 (describing the novelty requirement of patentability). Prior art is a
reference that is sufficiently described so that the public can be said to be in
possession of the reference, such as sufficiently labeled pictures and drawings. See,
e.g., MPEP § 2121.04 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Aug. 2012).
7
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (describing the nonobviousness requirement of
patentability).
8
Id. § 112 (describing the enablement requirement of patentability).
9
A more detailed discussion of the components of a patent is not relevant to this
note.
10
37 C.F.R. § 1.71(a) (2013).
11
MPEP § 1824 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015).
12
Id.
13
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 129 (6th ed. 2012).
14
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (2000).
15
See generally 37 C.F.R. § 1.53 (2015).
16
MERGES, supra note 13, at 191. Generally, at least fourteen months pass
before a patent examiner actually picks up an initial application. Id. at 191–92.
During this period, applicants may file additional papers, such as an information
disclosure statement, which describes the prior art known to the applicant at the
time of filing, or preliminary amendments, which are changes made to the
application before the patent examiner’s first “office action,” or response. Id. at 192.
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review of the application, including a search of the prior art.17
After the initial review, the examiner usually rejects most of the
claims in the application, often for reasons of obviousness or lack
of novelty.18
Applicants can amend their applications during prosecution;
“the most common reason [applicants amend] is to respond to a
rejection or other office action.”19 Generally, amendments are
permitted until the examiner issues a final rejection.20 However,
“final rejection” is a misnomer because an applicant can respond
to a final rejection, typically by filing a continuation21 or by
amending after final rejection.22
Generally, patent applications are published eighteen
months after their filing date.23 Publication grants the applicant
a limited version of the exclusionary right that accompanies a
patent if the patent ultimately issues.24 Publication also notifies
interested third parties who are permitted to submit prior art
references to be included in the prosecution file of the

17

MPEP § 904 (9th ed. Rev. 7, July 2015).
MERGES, supra note 13, at 192. The examiner must state the reasons for each
rejection and provide the applicant with information and references to aid in
deciding the desirability of continuing prosecution. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2012).
19
MERGES, supra note 13, at 192. (“[A]pplicants can also correct mistakes, add
or change drawings, and update the disclosure portion of the specification.”); see also
37 C.F.R. § 1.121(b) (2015).
20
MERGES, supra note 13, at 192.
21
“Filing a continuation resets the examination process” and has several
variations. Id. A simple continuation essentially acts as an amendment because it
“retains the benefit of the initial application’s filing date.” Id. A continuation-in-part
adds new matter to the specification that does not “retain the benefit of the earlier
filing date.” Id. at 192–93. Another variation of continuation involves filing an
amendment after final rejection “when the examiner has decided to allow some
claims but has issued a final rejection as to others.” Id. at 193. Essentially, this
allows the applicant to acquire a patent on the acceptable claims while still battling
over the rejected claims. Id. Additionally, applicants can communicate directly with
patent examiners through an examiner interview. Id.
22
Id. at 192; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 (2015). Additionally, if the applicant
believes there to be clear disagreements with the examiner, he or she may file an
appeal to the PTAB. 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) (2012).
23
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2012). However, applications that are provisional, no
longer pending, subject to government secrecy orders, or for design patents do not
get published. Id. at (b)(2)(A).
24
MERGES, supra note 13, at 193. This limited right allows the applicant to
“recover a reasonable royalty from an infringer,” provided that the “infringer has
actual notice of the published patent application” and “the claims in the published
application are ‘substantially identical’ to the claims in the patent when issued.” Id.
18
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application.25 Additionally, significant third party participation
is permitted through various administrative procedures
established by the AIA.26
Prosecution ends when the PTO grants the patent, when all
appeals are exhausted after final rejection, or when the applicant
abandons the patent application.27 Issued patents are made
available to the public through publication in the Patent
Gazette.28
Throughout the history of the patent system, Congress has
worked to reduce the quantity of “low-level” or “weak” patents.29
Many of these reforms were founded on the belief that additional
and more rigorous procedures in the PTO would improve patent
quality, thereby bolstering the integrity of the patent system
through an increase in both the public and the patent owner’s
confidence in the system.30
Congress’s attempts at patent system reform have led to the
creation of post-issuance review proceedings that allow patent
challengers additional and easier opportunities to invalidate
patents.31 In 1980, Congress created the process of ex parte
reexamination, the first of these post-issuance review
proceedings.32 Ex parte reexamination permitted any member of
the public to request that the PTO take a “second look” at a
patent at any time during the life of the patent.33 This type of
post-issuance review proceeding failed to achieve Congress’s
goals; ex parte reexamination was often employed multiple times

25
26

Id.
Id. at 194. IPR is one of these administrative procedures. See infra Section

II.A.
27
MERGES, supra note 13, at 194. However, prosecution can potentially
continue after issuance of a patent through a reissue. Id. A patentee can seek a
reissue of a patent if he comes to believe that the patent claims are either too broad
or too narrow, but reissues to broaden the scope of the patent claims must be
initiated within two years of the original issuance. Id.
28
Id.
29
Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 881 (2015).
30
See id. at 882 (citing Patent Policy: Hearing on H.R. 4564 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1982) (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks); 126 CONG. REC. 29895 (1980) (statement
of Rep. Kastenmeier)).
31
Dolin, supra note 29, at 883.
32
See Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at
35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012)).
33
Dolin, supra note 29, at 884.
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against the same patent, resulting in confusion among patent
owners and the public as to the existence and scope of patent
rights, and ex parte reexamination did not eliminate many
patents because most patent claims survived the process either
fully confirmed or moderately amended.34
In 1999, Congress enacted another alternative post-issuance
review proceeding called inter partes reexamination.35 Inter
partes reexamination was created under the belief that
“providing third parties with more opportunities for substantive
participation during the reexamination proceeding”36 would
“build confidence in the reexamination process so that third
parties [would] be inclined to raise patent challenges in this
forum rather than through litigation.”37 However, even with this
additional post-issuance review proceeding, the reexamination
process failed, in several ways, to fulfill its purpose of providing a
more affordable, faster, and expert alternative to litigation.38
First, the reexamination proceedings only focused on the
novelty and obviousness requirements for patentability.39
Because federal litigation can analyze any grounds of invalidity,
“the reexamination process simply bifurcate[d] the dispute for
resolution in two different fora.”40
Second, the reexamination proceedings and federal litigation
had no preclusive effect on each other with respect to the patent
challenger.41 Thus, the patent challenger could lose in one venue
and challenge the patent again in the other venue, but the patent
owner need only lose in one venue for his claims to be
permanently invalidated.42

34

Id.
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat.
1501 (codified in relevant part in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18 (2006)) (repealed 2012).
36
THE ADVISORY COMM. ON PATENT LAW REFORM: A REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14 (Aug. 1992), http://perma.cc/S29S-9BBS.
37
Id.
38
Dolin, supra note 29, at 902–03.
39
Id. at 903.
40
Id. at 884.
41
Id. at 903–04 (citing In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2012)).
42
See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350
(1971).
35
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Third, the reexamination proceedings were not binding on
each other.43 While the reexamination process was meant to give
the PTO a second look at a patent, the statute allowed unlimited
looks, “with the PTO empowered to reexamine the patent
multiple times with each subsequent decision to proceed to
reexamination and the conduct of reexamination itself not bound
by the result of previous reexamination processes.”44 The lack of
estoppel provisions between reexamination and litigation, and
especially between multiple reexamination proceedings, further
increased any uncertainty in the strength and quality of issued
patents.45
Fourth, the lack of estoppel provisions between these
proceedings increased potential costs by requiring participants to
pay for both proceedings.46 Patent owners were hurt more by the
increased costs because a patent can be subject to unlimited
reexaminations, resulting in a snowball effect.47
Finally, the reexamination process failed to resolve disputes
faster than litigation because the average length of a
reexamination proceeding was nearly equal to that of litigation.48
Once again, because reexamination proceedings were not a
substitute for litigation, the time spent in reexamination often
compounded the time spent in litigation.49
These flaws in the reexamination process gave patent
challengers the “opportunity to continuously cast doubt on
legitimate patent claims and to ‘blackmail’ patent holders into
lower royalty rates.”50 Congress enacted the AIA to better reform
the patent system by creating different mechanisms for
eliminating weak patents and, arguably, it has been successful in
these early years.51
43

See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012).
Dolin, supra note 29, at 904–05.
45
Id. at 908–09.
46
See In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (denying
rehearing en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[R]eexamination after a patent has
been sustained in court is a multiplier of cost, delay, and uncertainty . . . .”).
47
Dolin, supra note 29, at 906.
48
Id. at 907–08.
49
Id. at 908.
50
Id. at 909.
51
See Colleen Chien & Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design
of Post-Grant Patent Reviews, STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that
patent invalidation is a public good and that post-grant reviews, such as IPRs, can
reduce uncertainty over the boundaries and validity of granted patents).
44
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II. A CLOSE LOOK AT INTER PARTES REVIEW AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
This Part examines the details of IPR proceedings, discusses
the statistics concerning such proceedings, and provides an
example of IPR in practice.
A.

The America Invents Act and the Creation of Inter Partes
Review

In 2011, Congress reformed the patent law landscape by
passing the America Invents Act.52 Among other changes, the
AIA created a new type of proceeding: inter partes review.53 The
AIA also established the PTAB, which is the PTO’s
administrative tribunal, composed of administrative patent
judges who are charged with rendering decisions on appeals from
adverse examiner decisions, post-issuance challenges to patents,
and interferences.54 IPR was created as a less expensive and
quicker alternative to federal litigation, in which a third party
challenges the validity of a patent before the PTAB.55 The
differences between federal litigation and IPR illustrate some
issues that arise from offering IPR as an alternative to federal
litigation.
Standing to institute an IPR poses almost no obstacle to a
petitioner. Any person who is not the owner of a patent may
petition the PTO for an IPR of the patent within one year of
service of a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.56
However, any party who has filed a civil action in a federal
district court challenging the validity of a patent is barred from
petitioning for an IPR of the patent.57 But this bar does not
extend to counterclaims challenging the validity of a patent.58

52
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
53
35 U.S.C.A. § 311(a) (West 2014).
54
Id. § 6(a), (b).
55
See Patrick Doody, Post-Grant Proceedings: The Year Behind and the Year
Ahead, LAW360 (Oct. 1, 2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/475387/
post-grant-proceedings-the-year-behind-and-the-year-ahead (last visited Mar. 5,
2017).
56
37 C.F.R. § 42.101(b) (2012).
57
Id. § 42.101(a).
58
35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(3) (2012).
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Thus, the standing requirement for IPR is much more relaxed
than Article III standing required by federal courts for all cases,
including patent validity challenges.59
To institute an IPR of a patent, a petitioner must file after
the later of either nine months after issuance of the patent or, if
a post-grant review (“PGR”)60 is instituted, termination of such
PGR.61 Petitions for IPR must identify each challenged claim and
show how prior art, such as patents and printed publications,
invalidates the claims as un-patentable under either
35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103, which require that patents are novel and
nonobvious.62
Petitioners must take care to include all
arguments in the petition, because they cannot advance different
arguments later in the proceeding.63
After the petitioner files for IPR, the patent owner has three
months to file an optional preliminary response stating why an
IPR should not be instituted.64 At the end of the preliminary
response period, the PTAB has three months to decide whether to
59
See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted) (“[A]t an irreducible
minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to ‘show that
he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,’ and that the injury ‘fairly can be traced
to the challenged action’ and ‘is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.’ ”).
60
Another creation of the AIA, PGR was enacted to make the U.S. patent
issuance process similar to its European counterpart. See Filip De Corte et al., AIA
Post-Grant Review & European Oppositions: Will They Work in Tandem, or Rather
Pass Like Ships in the Night?, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 93, 96–97 (2012). Any person
who is not a patent owner may file a PGR request challenging the patent on any
ground of invalidity. 35 U.S.C. § 321(a), (b) (2012). A petitioner may only file a PGR
request within nine months of the patent issue or reissue date. Id. § 321(c). Once the
PTO institutes a PGR proceeding, the PTAB has twelve months to render its final
decision. Id. § 326(a)(11). Additional details about PGRs are not relevant for the
purpose of this Note.
61
37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a) (2013).
62
37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2012). Challenges based on novelty and obviousness are
the top two reasons for invalidating claims in litigation. See John R. Allison & Mark
A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J.
185, 209 (1998) (noting that in federal cases where anticipation—no novelty—was
raised in defense, courts invalidated 40.7% of patents, and where obviousness was
raised in defense, courts invalidated 36.3% of patents).
63
See Ryan Davis, 4 Mistakes That Can Doom AIA Petitions, LAW360 (Aug. 25,
2014, 5:49 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/570192/4-mistakes-that-can-doomaia-petitions (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
64
37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a), (b) (2016). New testimonial evidence, such as affidavits,
and claim amendments are excluded from the preliminary response. Id. § 42.107(c),
(d). However, the patent owner may disclaim one or more claims in the patent to
prevent an IPR on those claims. Id. § 42.107(e).
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institute an IPR.65 An IPR may only be instituted if the
information presented in the petition and any response “shows
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in
the petition.”66
Once an IPR is instituted, the PTAB has one year to reach
its final determination.67 IPRs are generally completed within
eighteen months of filing the petition. However, two exceptions
exist. First, the PTAB can extend the one-year review period, by
not more than six months, upon a showing of “good cause.”68
Second, the PTAB “may adjust the time periods” if several
proceedings are joined together.69
Therefore, IPRs can
potentially settle patent disputes on a more timely basis than
federal litigation.70
Moreover, the cost of an IPR is significantly lower than
federal litigation, which can easily cost several million dollars.71
The IPR fee is $23,000.72 Additionally, IPRs require $200 for
each claim in excess of twenty during the request phase and $400
for each claim in excess of fifteen during the review phase of the
proceeding.73 However, if the PTAB declines the petition for IPR,
the PTO will issue a refund of $14,000.74 Also, the quicker
adjudication time means that the parties owe less in attorney’s
fees, resulting in a total IPR cost of roughly $300,000 per side.75
Thus, IPR is certainly a more economically feasible option when
compared to federal litigation.
The IPR proceeding itself is conducted like a streamlined
trial, with the parties engaging in discovery, motions, and
arguments.76 First, the patent owner is granted a three-month
65

35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2012).
Id. § 314(a).
67
Id. § 316(a)(11).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See Sylvia Hsieh, More Patent Cases Are Being Taken on Contingency Fee
Basis, NEW ENGLAND IN-HOUSE (July 26, 2006), http://newenglandinhouse.com/
2006/07/26/more-patent-cases-taken-on-contingent-fee-basis/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2017) (“An average patent case will . . . take two to three years to litigate.”).
71
Id.
72
37 C.F.R. § 42.15(a)(1)–(2) (2015).
73
Id. § 42.15(a)(3)–(4).
74
Id. § 42.15(a)(2).
75
See Chien & Helmers, supra note 51, at 12.
76
See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756-01, 48,757 (Aug.
14, 2012) (displaying a representative timeline of the proceeding).
66
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discovery period.77 The patent owner must file a response to the
petition within these three months.78 During this time, the
patent owner may file a motion to amend the patent claims at
issue.79 Next, the petitioner is granted a three-month discovery
period.80 After this period, the petitioner must file a reply brief to
the patent owner’s response, as well as an opposition to any
claim amendments.81 The patent owner then has a one-month
period for further discovery and briefing.82 After the discovery
periods end, the parties may request an oral hearing to present
their arguments and live testimony before the PTAB.83 Finally,
the PTAB issues its final decision sometime after the oral
hearing but before the end of the statutory review period.84
At the beginning of an IPR proceeding, the PTAB issues a
claim construction regarding the patent claims at issue.85 Also
known as a claim interpretation, this defines the scope and
meaning of a claim.86 Claim construction is very important for
determining whether prior art invalidates a patent claim, and
this area represents a key difference between IPR proceedings
and federal litigation. In the federal district courts, claims are
given their ordinary meaning by reference to what a person
having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) would
understand.87 However, during IPR proceedings, claims are
given their “broadest reasonable construction.”88 While claims

77

Id.
Id.
79
Id. Such an amendment “may not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent
or introduce new matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3) (2012). Also, the patent owner has
the burden to show written-description support in the original disclosure for each
added or amended claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(b)(1) (2015).
80
Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,757–58.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 48,757.
83
Id. at 48,757–58, 48,768.
84
Id. at 48,757, 48,768.
85
See Scott A. McKeown, Early PTAB Claim Construction - The Faster, Cheaper
Markman Order, PATENTS POST-GRANT (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.patentspostgrant.
com/lang/en/2013/10/early-ptab-claim-construction-to-drive-litigation-settlements
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
86
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1247–48 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
87
See, e.g., L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Prods., Inc., 499 F.3d 1303,
1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314–19 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
88
37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2016).
78
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are still interpreted according to a PHOSITA’s understanding,89
the broadest reasonable construction standard is broader than
the federal district court standard. “The broader the claim
construction, the more likely it is to sweep prior art within its
ambit,” thus, making it much easier for patent challengers to
prevail in an IPR.90 After issuing its claim construction, the
PTAB determines whether the challenged patent claims are
invalid.91
Additionally, IPR proceedings differ from federal litigation in
terms of the chosen evidentiary standard for patent invalidity.
In the federal district courts, the party challenging the validity of
a patent claim must prove invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence.92 However, in IPR proceedings, the petitioner must
prove invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence.93 Because
IPR uses a relaxed evidentiary standard, the potential exists for
inconsistent rulings where a patent claim is held invalid by the
PTAB, but held valid by a federal district court judge.94
After the completion of an IPR, the petitioner is estopped
from asserting any ground that was “raised or reasonably could
have [been] raised” before the PTAB.95 This estoppel attaches
from the date of the PTAB’s “final written decision.”96 Also, this
estoppel applies to proceedings before the federal district courts,
the International Trade Commission, and the PTO.97 However,
because the validity of patent claims can only be challenged on
novelty and obviousness grounds in an IPR, this estoppel does
not prevent a challenger from attacking a patent in multiple
forums. This essentially gives the challenger two “bite[s] at the

89
See Captioncall, L.L.C., v. Ultratec, Inc., IPR2013-00543, 2015 WL 981641, at
*5–6 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2015).
90
Dolin, supra note 29, at 916.
91
Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027, 2014 WL 824156, at *6
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 7, 2014).
92
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011) (“We consider
whether [35 U.S.C.] § 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. We hold that it does.”).
93
35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012).
94
See David L. McCombs et al., Federal Circuit Appeals from the PTAB: A New
Game or Just the Same Old Practice?, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 240, 246
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apple.” Moreover, this “estoppel provision[] [is] claim . . . specific,
[thus,] subsequent IPR requests can be brought . . . against the
same patent.”98
B.

The Statistics Relating to Inter Partes Review Proceedings

Since IPR became available on September 16, 2012,99 it has
become increasingly popular. Seventeen petitions were filed in
the first few days in fiscal year 2012, 514 petitions were filed in
fiscal year 2013, and 1,310 petitions were filed in fiscal year
2014.100 During the first twenty-nine months of availability,
approximately 2,300 petitions for IPR were filed.101 Of the
petitions it has reviewed, the PTO ordered around eighty percent
into trial.102
As of January 18, 2015, the PTAB has conducted 163 IPRs
through completion.103 The results of these IPRs break down as
follows: all claims were cancelled in 121 cases, some claims were
cancelled and some claims were upheld—a split decision—in 18
cases, and all claims were upheld in 24 cases.104 Thus, the PTAB
has invalidated nearly seventy-five percent of the claims
challenged through IPR proceedings.105
In contrast, the
invalidation rate in the federal district courts is only about fortytwo percent.106 However, this figure is misleading because in
federal litigation patents can be invalidated on more grounds
than novelty or obviousness.107
When focused on patents
invalidated on novelty or obviousness grounds, the invalidation
rate in federal district courts drops to just over one-third.108
98

Dolin, supra note 29, at 928–29.
Inter Partes Disputes, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.
gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-invents-act-aia/inter-partes-disputes (last
visited Mar. 6, 2017).
100
Patent Trial and Appeal Board AIA Progress: Statistics (as of 01/01/2015),
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 1 http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/aia_
statistics_1_1_2015.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
101
See Patent Trial and Appeal Board AIA Progress: Statistics (as of
01/08/2015), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 1, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/aia_statistics_01_08_2015.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
102
Id. at 2.
103
Dolin, supra note 29, at 926.
104
Id.
105
Id.
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John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent
Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1787 (2014).
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35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012).
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Allison & Lemley, supra note 62, at 209.
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Although supporters of the current IPR standards may
consider the high patent invalidation rate as proof that the PTAB
is successfully culling weak patents, this argument is undercut
by the PTAB’s use of a lower evidentiary standard and broader
claim construction than those used by the federal district courts.
Additionally, the high invalidation rate is not surprising given
that the PTAB can only institute an IPR when the petitioner has
shown a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one
challenged claim. Thus, the high invalidation rate can be viewed
as essentially a “reflection of the PTAB’s ability to forecast
correctly how it will decide on at least one claim.”109 However,
this “selection mechanism”110 is controlled by the lower standards
used in IPR, so the existence of the high invalidation rate does
not necessarily mean that only weak patents are being
invalidated. Even if every invalidated patent were a weak
patent, this does not justify using lower standards. Surely, a
truly weak patent would not survive review under the district
court standards.111 Additionally, a closer look at the statistics
may cast further doubt on the belief that only weak patents are
being invalidated.
First, some of the patents in this early stage of IPR have
already survived litigation, reexamination, or both.112 More
specifically, fifteen percent of these patents have previously
survived reexamination—meaning that the patent claims at
issue were reconfirmed—under the PTO’s preponderance of the
evidence standard and broadest reasonable claim construction.113

109
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for its Money:
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV 235, 253 (2015).
110
Chien & Helmers, supra note 51, at 5.
111
This may explain the not insignificant invalidation rate in the district courts.
112
Dolin, supra note 29, at 927.
113
Id.
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Moreover, these patents account for over eight percent of IPR
final decisions.114 These specific decisions result in a per claim
invalidation rate of eighty-three percent.115
Additionally, it seems that the PTAB awards no deference to
the consideration of prior art references by the patent examiner
during the patent prosecution process. Thirty-one percent of IPR
petitions relied only on new—previously unconsidered—prior art,
three percent relied only on old art—previously considered and
found not to be invalidating—and sixty-six percent relied on a
combination of old and new prior art.116 Based on prior art
references, the IPR final written decisions result in the following
invalidation rates: ninety-three percent where the petition relied
only on new prior art, ninety-three percent where the petition
relied only on old prior art, and eighty-one percent where the
petition relied on a combination of old and new prior art.117
Finally, the PTAB’s treatment of motions to amend claims
leads to the conclusion that this ability of the patent owner is
“merely illusory.”118 The opportunity for patent owners to move
to amend claims is an advantage that IPR proceedings offer over
federal district court litigation.119 However, patent owners have
only filed motions to amend claims in fifty cases,120 and the PTAB

114
Id. This difference between the percentages of patents reviewed and those
that reached final decision is likely attributable to settlements that resulted in
termination of the IPR proceedings. Roughly fifteen percent of all IPR petitions filed
were ultimately settled between the petitioner and the patent holder. See Patent
Trial and Appeal Board AIA Progress: Statistics (as of Jan. 8, 2015), U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE 2–3, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_
statistics_01_08_2015.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (noting 340 settlements out of
2323 total petitions).
115
Dolin, supra note 29, at 928 n.335 (“Again, the number of observations is
small (thirteen out of 163 decisions involved patents that have previously prevailed
in reexamination), and therefore the great disparity in percentages does not indicate
a great disparity in raw numbers. Nonetheless, it does not appear either from the
numbers or from reading the PTAB's decisions that prior reexaminations have had
much effect on the outcome of the IPR. Additionally, occasionally patent challengers
have filed both IPR requests and ex parte reexamination requests in hopes of
prevailing in at least one forum.”).
116
Id. at 928.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 929.
119
See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (“[W]e do not permit courts to redraft claims.”).
120
Dolin, supra note 29, at 929.
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has only granted such motions twice.121 One of these granted
motions to amend yielded no opposition brief from the
petitioner.122
Thus, it seems that another aspect of IPR
proceedings swings in favor of the petitioner because “[w]hat was
meant to be the counter-balance to the [petitioner]’s lower burden
of proof in practice does not exist.”123
The popularity of IPR proceedings has led many litigants to
request the federal district courts to stay litigation pending the
final decision of the IPR.124 Through staying litigation, the
parties hope to resolve their disputes through the faster, less
expensive IPR proceeding.125 In ruling on a request to stay
litigation, a federal district court judge will usually balance three
factors: “(1) whether a stay will unduly prejudice or present a
clear tactical disadvantage to the nonmoving party, (2) whether a
stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case, and
(3) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has
been set.”126
Since the inception of IPR proceedings in 2012, there have
been more than 170 motions to stay litigation.127 Federal district
courts grant these motions at an average rate above seventy
percent.128 When the parties disagree on the motion, the grant
rate is about sixty percent, but when the parties agree, the grant
rate is nearly ninety-eight percent.129

121
See Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc. v. United States., No. IPR2013-00124,
2014 WL 2120542, at *10 (P.T.A.B. May 20, 2014) (Final Written Decision); Tandus
Flooring, Inc. v. Interface, Inc., No. IPR2013-00333, 2014 WL 6983455, at *32
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 8, 2014) (Final Written Decision).
122
Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 2014 WL 2120542, at *1.
123
Dolin, supra note 29, at 929.
124
Aashish Kapadia, Inter Partes Review: A New Paradigm in Patent Litigation,
23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 113, 125 (2015).
125
Id.
126
Soverain Software LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 (E.D.
Tex. 2005) (citing Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (W.D.N.Y.
1999)). Additionally, the Federal Circuit has advised against granting both a
preliminary injunction and a motion to stay in the same case. See Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 549 F.3d 842, 849 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that both
preliminary injunctions and motions to stay depend on whether there is a
“substantial issue of patent validity”).
127
Kapadia, supra note 124, at 131.
128
Id.
129
Id.
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Inter Partes Review in Practice

Through its decisions, the PTAB demonstrates willingness, if
not a desire, to invalidate patents. For example, in Microsoft
Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,130 the PTAB invalidated eleven claims of
On September 18, 2012,
Proxyconn’s challenged patent.131
Microsoft petitioned for IPR of claims 1, 3, 10, 11, 12, 22, 23, and
24 of U.S. Patent No. 6,757,717 (“the ‘717 Patent”), then on
January 11, 2013, Microsoft filed another petition for IPR of
claims 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, and 14 of the ‘717 Patent.132 After the
PTAB granted IPRs to review all challenged claims, Microsoft
moved for joinder, which the PTAB granted.133 All challenged
claims were challenged on both novelty and obviousness
grounds.134
The ‘717 Patent described a system for data access in a
packet switched network, consisting of a sender/computer and a
receiver/computer that communicate through the network.135
The ‘717 Patent “provide[d] a way to reduce the amount of
redundant data transmitted over a network.”136 The PTAB
applied the broadest reasonable claim construction standard to
interpret six claim terms. First, the PTAB determined that “data
access” referred to the freedom or ability to obtain or use data.137
Second, the PTAB interpreted “permanent storage memory” to
mean “any non-volatile memory that supports multiple write
operations.” Third, the PTAB concluded that “sender/computer”
means “a computer that sends data,” “receiver/computer” means
“a computer that receives data,” and that each respective
computer “can encompass multiple devices including
intermediaries.”138 Fourth, the PTAB concluded that the term
“gateway . . . connected to said packet-switched network in such
a way that network packets sent between at least two other
computers pass through it[]” did not “limit which computers may
constitute the ‘two other computers’ between which the gateway
130
Nos. IPR2012-00026, IPR2013-00109, 2014 WL 721998, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Feb.
19, 2014).
131
Id. at *34.
132
Id. at *1.
133
Id.
134
Id. at *5.
135
Id. at *2.
136
Id.
137
Id. at *6.
138
Id. at *8.
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is connected.”139 Fifth, the PTAB determined that the “means for
comparison between digital digests” refers to a structure that can
compare any digital digest received from the network with any
Finally, the PTAB concluded that
other digital digest.140
“ ‘searching for data with the same digital digest in said network
cache memory’ requires an ability to identify a particular data
object with the same digital digest from a set of potentially many
data objects stored in the network cache memory.”141
Applying these claims constructions to the prior art, the
PTAB determined that Microsoft established by a preponderance
of evidence that claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 22, and 23
were unpatentable due to anticipation, and that claims 1, 3, and
10 were unpatentable due to obviousness.142 Additionally, the
PTAB determined that Microsoft’s challenge to claims 6, 7, 9, 11,
12, and 14 on the grounds of obviousness in light of combined
prior art was moot; they were cancelled because they were
anticipated by one of the prior art references relevant to the
obviousness challenge.143
Following the PTAB’s final written decision, Proxyconn
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.144 First, Proxyconn challenged the PTAB’s construction
of the phrase “gateway . . . connected to said packet-switched
network in such a way that network packets sent between at
least two other computers,” because Proxyconn argued that the
“ ‘two other computers’ referred only to the sender/computer and
the receiver/computer.”145 The court, in light of the language of
the claims and specification, agreed with Proxyconn’s
construction and found the PTAB’s construction to be
“unreasonably broad.”146 The court vacated and remanded the
PTAB’s findings as to claims 6, 7, and 9 because they were based
on an unreasonably broad construction of the term.147

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id. at *9.
Id. at *9–10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 16–17, 26.
Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1299.
Id.
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Additionally, Proxyconn challenged the PTAB’s construction
of the terms “sender/computer” and “receiver/computer,” arguing
that they should be limited to just those two computers.148 Again,
the court analyzed the language of the claims and the
specification and agreed with Proxyconn’s construction, finding
the PTAB’s construction unreasonably broad.149 Because the
PTAB’s determination that claims 1, 3, 10, 22, and 23 were
unpatentable was based on an unreasonably broad construction,
the court vacated and remanded the PTAB’s findings as to claims
1, 3, 10, 22, and 23.150
On remand, the PTAB again concluded that claims 1, 3, 6, 7,
9, 10, 22, and 23 of the ‘717 Patent were unpatentable.151
Addressing the obviousness challenges to claims 6, 7, and 9 that
it found moot in the initial IPR, the PTAB found “that the
Federal Circuit’s instruction that the gateway be separate from
the [two] ‘other’ computers . . . [was] met by the combination of”
prior art.152 Hence, the PTAB concluded that claims 6, 7, and 9
were unpatentable because they would have been obvious over
the prior art.153 Likewise, the PTAB used the Federal Circuit’s
construction of “sender/computer” and “receiver/computer” to
again find that claims 1, 3, and 10 were unpatentable because
they were obvious over prior art.154 Additionally, the PTAB used
the Federal Circuit’s construction of “receiver/computer” to again
find that claims 22 and 23 were unpatentable due to anticipation
by prior art.155
Although this case was the first time the Federal Circuit
reversed and remanded an IPR final written decision, it
demonstrates the potential effectiveness of IPR. Under two very
different claim constructions, the PTAB found that Microsoft met
its evidentiary burden to invalidate Proxyconn’s patent claims.
Perhaps this means that Proxyconn’s patent was indeed weak
and deserved to be invalidated. If so, cases such as this justify
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150
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Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., Nos. IPR2012-00026, IPR2013-00109,
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the creation of IPR. But Congress needs to make further changes
to achieve its goal of eliminating weak patents while offering a
viable alternative to federal district court litigation.
III. HOW TO MAKE INTER PARTES REVIEW A MORE EFFECTIVE
PROCEEDING
In many circumstances, the simplest solution is the greatest
solution. By creating IPR, Congress may have finally found a
way to resolve the issue of weak patents. By mandating patent
challengers—or infringement defendants—to file for IPR
whenever they challenge the validity of patent claims on novelty
or obviousness grounds, and by making PTAB decisions binding
on federal district courts, Congress would potentially eliminate
weak patents while providing a faster, less expensive alternative
to litigation.
By forcing patent challengers to use IPR, the PTAB would
have more opportunities to invalidate weak patents.
Additionally, because the petitioner must demonstrate a
reasonable likelihood of success before an IPR is instituted, a
denial of IPR would be very instructive for a federal district
court’s validity analysis.
By denying IPR, the PTAB is
essentially telling the court that, based on the petitioner’s prior
art references, the challenged patent claims are strong enough to
survive IPR’s relaxed standards. If the challenged patent claims
are strong enough to survive IPR’s relaxed standards, they are
certainly strong enough to survive federal litigation’s heightened
standards. Thus, the court could use the PTAB’s decision in
place of its own validity analysis and move on with the trial.
Conversely, if the PTAB institutes IPR and invalidates the
challenged patent claims, then the federal litigation is likely
resolved as well.
To fully implement this proposal, Congress would have to
mandate that the federal district courts stay litigation until IPRs
are resolved and that the PTAB’s decisions are binding on the
courts.
This would eliminate the possibility of parallel
proceedings and ensure consistency in patent validity
determinations.
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CONCLUSION
After several years in practice, IPR proceedings have, by
themselves, proven to be faster and less expensive than federal
litigation. However, when both IPR and litigation are allowed,
prices soar. Congress could give IPR the test of time or it could
make periodic adjustments, like a pilot constantly making minor
corrections to stay on course. Increasing the frequency of IPR
and making the PTAB’s decisions binding on federal district
courts could be one such adjustment. This adjustment could help
make IPR a desirable alternative for dispute resolution, leading
to time saved, costs reduced, and, potentially, a better way to
solve the problem of weak patents. Overall, the patent system
would improve and Congress would fulfill its constitutional
charge to promote scientific progress.

